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BOOK REVIEW 
DEFINING EFFECTIVE CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
IN EDUCATION 
EQUALITY AND EDUCATION. By Michael A. Rebell and Arthur R. 
Block. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. x, 340. 
$28.50. 
Reviewed by Neal Devins* 
Federal civil rights enforcement in public education has been with-
out a clear agenda since pre-1970 efforts to eradicate segregation in 
Southern schools. Issues regarding what constitutes discrimination, 
appropriate enforcement techniques, the relationship between state 
and federal government, and the sweep of the nondiscrimination man-
date have been viewed differendy from administration to administra-
tion. The Reagan administration, for example, has taken a 
nonobstructionist stance, placing great trust in state and local educa-
tional policymaking.1 In sharp contrast, the Carter administration-at 
the behest of civil rights groups-committed itself to a litany of en-
forcement procedures.2 Given these differences, a longitudinal study 
of enforcement efforts should prove quite worthwhile. Such a study 
could reveal whether, on an institutional level, executive enforcement 
efforts are hampered by changing political agendas and could clarify 
the values that properly underlie civil rights policy. 
Michael A. Rebell and Arthur R. Block's longitudinal review of fed-
eral civil rights enforcement in the New York City school system, Equal-
ity and Education, sets out to examine many of these issues. Specifically, 
the authors claim that their case study will shed light on how discrimi-
nation is defined, the nature of executive decisionmaking, and the effec-
tiveness of executive enforcement efforts. Unfortunately, their work is 
fundamentally flawed. Insufficient attention is paid to many significant 
issues, most prominendy, the influence of federal desegregation assist-
ance programs on school board action and the impact of the Reagan 
administration. Yet even if these matters received more substantial 
treatment, the New York City situation may be too anomalous to yield 
• Assistant General Counsel, Commission on Civil Rights. B.A. 1978 Georgetown 
University; J.D. 1982 Vanderbilt Law School. I wish to thank Jeremy Rabkin, Jim 
Stedman, and David Tell for their comments on earlier versions of this Book Review. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author. 
1. See White House, America's New Beginnings: A Program for Economic Recov-
ery 25-26 (1981). 
2. See Rabkin, Captive of the Court: A Federal Agency in Receivership, Reg. 
May/june 1984, at 16-26. 
T(\Q~ 
\ 
HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev.  1094 1986
1094 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86: 1093 
general conclusions regarding federal civil rights enforcement. In the 
end, Equality and Education serves only the limited purpose of describing 
specific events surrounding federal efforts to enforce antidiscrimination 
laws in New York City schools. 
I. THE NEW YORK CITY REVIEW 
A. Background 
1. The OCR's Uncertain Agenda.- One decade after Brown v. Board 
of Education, 3 Congress set the stage for federal enforcement of the 
Brown mandate by enacting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 
Title VI prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discrim-
inating on the basis of race. In the field of education, the task of en-
forcing Title VI fell to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the 
Department ofHealth, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of 
Education). During the mid-1960s, the OCR-armed with the power 
to cut off federal education funds-was remarkably successful at com-
batting racial discrimination in education.5 In 1965 alone, more actual 
desegregation of southern schools occurred than in the decade follow-
ing Brown.6 
But, almost as quickly as they had coalesced, the forces that made 
the first substantial inroads into the South's segregated school systems 
were challenged and ultimately dissipated. The Nixon administration 
opposed expansive school desegregation techniques mandated by the 
OCR and the courts,7 and cautioned against improperly extending fed-
eral control over education. 8 Increasingly disquieting to both elected 
branches was the extension of desegregation to nonsouthem schools 
and the prospect of mandatory busing.9 By 1974, congressional restric-
tions on OCR enforcement standards had effectively removed the 
school desegregation issue from the agencies to the courts. Indeed, the 
OCR's failure to pursue fund termination proceedings against school 
systems that refused to adopt comprehensive desegregation plans re-
3. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
4. Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4). 
5. See Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism, 47 Pub. Interest 
101, 109-12 (1977). 
6. See Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the 
Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1243, 1246 (1984). Be-
tween 1963 and 1968, the percentage of black children in all-black schools in the South 
dropped from ninety-eight percent to twenty-five percent. G. Orfie1d, Public School De-
segregation in the United States, 1968-80, at 5 (1983). 
7. See G. Orfield, Must We Bus?: Segregated Schools and National Policy 243 
(1978). 
8. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 6, at 1250-51. 
9. See G. Orfield, supra note 6, at 235-42; see also Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 
U.S. 189 (1973) (geographic extension of desegregation mandate); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg County Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I (1971) (busing). 
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suited in court imposed deadlines for the processing of OCR enforce-
ment actions.10 Finally, the OCR no longer simply confronted racial 
segregation in Southern districts. Instead, OCR responsibilities ex-
tended to discrimination on the basis of sex, language, and handicap-
frequendy in northern school systems where segregation had not been 
legally mandated. 
With its wings clipped, its credibility challenged, and facing more 
complex issues, the OCR sought new ways to define its mission and 
retain its viability. One of these was the "Big City Reviews" program 
instituted by the Ford administration. Equality and Education is about 
New York City's "Big City Reviews" experience. A brief recital of the 
program's contours will be useful before turning to Rebell and Block's 
analysis. 
2. New York's "Big City Review."- The OCR's potential and its lim-
itations were fully tested in New York City. Student assignment poli-
cies and ability tracking (pp. 114-16) resulted in racially isolated 
schools. The few minority faculty members tended to be placed in 
predominandy minority schools (pp. 81-83). Further complicating 
matters were OCR concerns about inequities in the allocation of educa-
tional resources and the application of disciplinary rules (pp. 114-16). 
But New York law did not mandate the maintenance of separate educa-
tional facilities. Instead, the New York City situation had emerged from 
an unhappy combination of union protectionism, fiscal crisis, haphaz-
ard educational policymaking, and-possibly-illegal discrimination. 
The OCR-equating statistical disparities with illegal discrimina-
tion (p. 113)-challenged teacher hiring, 11 student assignment poli-
cies, 12 and the distribution of educational resources in New York 
City.l3 By 1975, thirty OCR staffers and six consultants were working 
10. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973). OCR's hesitancy to util-
ize its Title VI cut-off authority also resulted in greater agency reliance on the Emer-
gency School Aid Act of 1972 (ESAA). Title VII, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235. Under the ESAA, eligible school districts applied to OCR 
for desegregation-related funding assistance. OCR then prodded school districts under 
its authority to determine school district eligibility. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 
6, at 1252-54. 
11. New York City employed a "two track" hiring system (p. 82). Under the first 
track, teachers who passed the city's certification exam were listed in order and offered a 
vacancy on the basis of rank. Under the second track, teachers could be hired either out 
of order or without passing the certification exam, but could only teach in the city's 
lowest ranked schools. The OCR alleged that a disproportionate number of minority 
teachers were hired under the second track and forced to teach in schools with large 
majorities of minority students (pp. 82-83). 
12. The OCR's concerns over student assignments focused on New York City's ex-
tensive use of achievement-based tracking. Under this system, the school board en-
gaged in ability grouping for all children above the first grade (p. 126), resulting in the 
near separation of students along racial lines (p. 119). 
13. The OCR, among other things, contended that per-pupil faculty expenditures 
were lower and the quality of instructional materials were inferior at predominantly mi-
nority schools (pp. 114-15). 
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full-force; over one million dollars was devoted to the purchase of com-
puters and the design of an investigative model (p. 67). In justifying 
this tremendous expense, the OCR claimed that through the New York 
City review it would" 'develop[] a whole new complement of skills .. . 
[and] ... procedures and investigative techniques applicable to large 
city systems ... .'" (p. 67). The OCR's director Martin Gerry also 
intended to use the review to increase the agency's emphasis on what 
he considered the next battleground in the fight for equal education 
opportunities-namely, the intradistrict resource allocation issue.H 
After the 1976 elections, the OCR reduced the scope of its review 
efforts, abandoning, among other things, its efforts to equalize intradis-
trict expenditures (pp. 118-19). By 1978, however, the OCR had 
reached settlement agreements with the school board on both faculty 
hiring and student tracking issues.15 The force of these agreements 
was short-lived, however, because the Reagan administration subse-
quently diluted their effect (pp. Ill, 132-33). The Reagan OCR was 
influenced by numerous factors, including partisan political pressure by 
New York Republicans (p. 163), a more restrictive view of what consti-
tutes illegal discrimination, and an education policy agenda that em-
phasized the independence and trustworthiness of local school 
systems. 16 
B. Rebell and Block's Assessment of the New York City Review 
Rebell and Block evaluate the New York City review from three 
perspectives: (1) an ideological perspective focused on how competing 
models of equality (statistically-based equality of results versus process-
based equality of opportunity) were played out during the OCR review 
(pp. 6-8, 139-50); (2) an implementation perspective, explaining why 
the OCR review did or did not accomplish its stated goals (pp. 8-10, 
151-70); and (3) a comparative institutional perspective designed to as-
sess the strengths and weaknesses of each branch of government in the 
enforcement of civil rights laws (pp. 10-12, 171-96). 
The authors have mixed feelings about the OCR's ability to accom-
plish its enforcement objectives through this review. On one hand, 
14. Former OCR director Martin Gerry suggested to Jeremy Rabkin, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Government at Cornell University, that the intradistrict resource issue was a 
main thrust of the New York City review. Conversation with Jeremy Rabkin Uan. 14, 
1986). 
15. On the question of faculty hiring and assignment, the school board agreed to 
abolish its "two track" hiring system by merging the two eligibility lists and eliminating 
rank-order hiring (pp. 101-02). With respect to student services, tracking was to be 
based on objective nondiscriminatory measures, was not to begin until the third grade, 
and was to utilize broader groupings of students (p. 126). 
16. See generally Devins & Stedman, supra note 6 (examining effects of Reagan 
administration's "New Federalism" on school desegregation in Chicago); Devins, Clos-
ing the Classroom Door to Civil Rights, 11 Human Rights 26 (Winter 1984) (evaluating 
Regan Justice Department's legal interpretations in the fields of race and education). 
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they recognize that "compliance lagged far behind the agreed stan-
dards, and delays and political intervention eventually led to renegoti-
ation ... " (p. 200). This leads them to suggest that enforcement would 
be enhanced if greater reliance were placed on the courts (pp. 182-83). 
On the other hand, they ultimately view the New York City experiment 
as an agency success, claiming that it "led to positive changes" (p. 199) 
and reflected "a process of persuasion and bargaining, that produced 
two balanced agreements reflecting local program and political reali-
ties" (p. 199). In so concluding, Rebell and Block focus their attention 
on the bargaining process that resulted in the 1978 settlement agree-
ments. Events subsequent to the signing of these agreements are, for 
the most part, not considered in their work. 
The authors amply demonstrate the conciliatory nature of the ne-
gotiations between the OCR and the school board (pp. 125-27). New 
York City agreed both to modify its use of testing and to restructure its 
faculty assignment structure so as to ensure proportionate racial bal-
ance throughout the system (pp. 98-99). The OCR also made conces-
sions: the board was granted "unprecedented flexibility" to meet its 
objectives (p. 99); the board could justify noncompliance if it resulted 
from "'educationally-based program exceptions'" (p. 99); and class-
wide ability grouping would be permitted, though to a limited extent 
(pp. 126-27). 
Rebell and Block claim that such a compromise was possible be-
cause Congress, when it enacted title VI, failed to choose between the 
"equality of opportunity" and "equality of results" strands of egalitar-
ian theory (pp. 43-48). Furthermore, they hail this arrangement as an 
ideological masterstroke, "because it promoted an open dialogue be-
tween adherents of the opportunity and result perspectives and allowed 
the complementary aspects of the ideological strands to merge into two 
compromise agreements" (p. 140). The authors, however, also recog-
nize that these agreements can be understood as the by-products of 
politics as usual. They suggest that the Carter OCR-which entered 
into the settlement agreements-did not want to ruffle the feathers of a 
city controlled by its own party, 17 and thus limited the scope of its in-
quiry and granted the school board substantial discretion in attaining 
agreement objectives18 (pp. 161-62). In contrast, the authors note 
that the OCR review grew out of earlier Nixon administration efforts to 
17. Another significant factor was the power of the city's teacher's union, the 
United Federation of Teachers, particularly its national president, Albert Shanker, 
whose "presence provides the most direct explanation for why New York City's faculty 
assignment agreement ... omitted any specific references to mandatory teacher trans-
fers" (p. 163). 
18. The authors also note that the Carter administration OCR, which was "part of a 
pro-civil rights administration," was concerned with the tremendous amount of agency 
resources being devoted to the New York review (p. 159). 
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unearth embarassing civil rights violations in New York and other 
northern democratic centers (p. 161). 
At the same time, Rebell and Block recognize that there is a world 
of difference between meaningful reform and political compromise. 
They claim that unless there is an "[enforceable] mandate for immedi-
ate, statistically definable changes," (p. 167), flexible agreements such 
as New York City's will work only to the extent that both sides have a 
strong commitment to the bargain. On this score, they note that polit-
ical resistance led to the failure of the teacher assignment agreement, 
while political support fostered the successful implementation of the 
student service provision (p. 169). 
Closely tied to their conclusions regarding the formation and im-
plementation of the settlement agreement, Rebell and Block argue that 
the courts might prove to be a more stable and competent enforcer of 
antidiscrimination laws in education than the OCR. To support an ex-
pandedjudicial role, they argue that the continuity provided by judicial 
enforcement is often more effective than politically vulnerable agency 
enforcement. They further suggest, pointing to their previous work, 
Educational Policy Making and the Courts, 19 that judicial remedial involve-
ment in school district affairs is "both less intrusive and more compe-
tent than is generally assumed" (p. 182). Finally, they conclude that 
increased reliance on judicial enforcement of title VI should not pose 
separation of powers problems (pp. 194-95). 
11. REVIEWING THE REVIEW OF THE REVIEW 
Rebell and Block's suggestion that the New York City experiment 
produced positive concrete outcomes is remarkable. When one consid-
ers the initial scope of the OCR effort and the Reagan administration's 
subsequent renegotiation of decree provisions, the New York City re-
view would seem, from the OCR's perspective, to be a tremendous fail-
ure. The school board's practice of complying only with provisions it 
found acceptable calls into question the agreements' purported ideo-
logical balance. Moreover, it is misleading to attribute school board 
concessions to OCR authority under title VI. During the course of the 
OCR review, the focus of agency activity shifted from title VI enforce-
ment to school board eligibility for special desegregation funds and 
other funds of greater magnitude (p. 187).20 In other words, the pro-
cess culminating in the 1978 agreements may indicate nothing more 
19. M. Rebell & A. Block, Educational Policymaking and the Courts: An Empirical 
Study of judicial Activism (1982). 
20. See supra note 10. The authors do recognize that the loss of such government 
dollars "were more significant in New York City than the remote threat of a Title VI 
funding termination .... " (p. 187). They downplay the significance of this conclusion, 
however, argning that the threatened Joss of such government funding was more signifi-
cant in other cities than in New York. Although 1 cannot say that this conclusion is in 
error, I am troubled by it. The school board vigorously challenged in court the OCR's 
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profound than that the ability to withhold federal largesse is a potent 
bargaining tool. 
That in this way the carrot may work better than the stick is never 
fully considered by Rebell and Block.21 This omission, however, only 
reflects a larger problem in Equality and Education. The authors, for the 
most part, limit themselves to an isolated portrayal of the New York 
City review; differences between OCR efforts in New York and other 
big cities receive only brief mention, and no explanation is offered of 
differences between mid-1970s OCR efforts and agency efforts in either 
the mid-1960s or mid-1980s. These omissions vitiate the ability of 
Equality and Education to speak broadly and with authority on federal 
civil rights enforcement. 
Without adequate discussion of other cities' experiences, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the New York City review was genuinely re-
flective of agency enforcement capabilities or merely a singular 
phenomenon. The authors' general remarks regarding the compara-
tive strengths and weaknesses of OCR enforcement are thus suspect. 
New York's size, its 1970s' fiscal crisis, the strength of its teachers' 
union, and its practices regarding teacher assiguments and student 
services were unique. Also unique was the OCR's reliance on its New 
York City experiment both as a model for further big city reviews and 
as a launching pad for agency attacks on intradistrict resource 
allocation. 22 
refusal to extend such government largesse to them. See Board ofEduc. v. Harris, 444 
u.s. 130 (1979). 
21. The authors do note that OCR enforcement might be enhanced by "providing 
the agency with plausible-not theoretical-sanctions" (p. 187), and they do mention 
that the "carrot" was effective in other big cities. But their analysis ends there. This is 
unfortunate since most of the OCR's mid-to-late-seventies success is attributable to this 
approach. As President Carter's OCR director David Tatal commented: "[These stat-
utes] are among the most effective ways of enforcing nondiscrimination provisions of 
law and ensuring equal opportunities for the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of 
federal financial assistance." J. Stedman, The Possible Impact of the Education Consoli-
dation and Improvement Act of 1981 on Activities That Have Been Funded Under the 
Emergency School Aid Act, Congressional Research Serv. Uan. 11, 1982), reprinted in 
School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 749 (1982). 
22. Furthermore, as David Kirp demonstrated in his study of the desegregation ex-
periences of five San Frans is co communities, thinking about racial justice solely in terms 
of uniformity is inappropriate. D. Kirp,Just Schools (1982); see also Devins, Integration 
and Local Politics, 73 Pub. Int. 175 (Fall1983) (reviewing D. Kirp, supra) (agreeing that 
uniform solutions to the segregation problems of varying communities are inadequate). 
This conclusion certainly extends to the OCR. Take for example, the Carter OCR's 
efforts to enforce title VI in Chicago. This enforcement effort was complicated by presi-
dential politics. The Carter administration, in order to secure city support for its 1980 
election campaign, flip-flopped on its initial demand of numerically-based equality and 
agreed to a settlement decree that provided only for "the establishment [at the discre-
tion of the school board] of the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated 
schools." Consent Decree at 4, United States v. Board ofEduc. No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. 111. 
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More striking than Rebell and Block's inadequate exploration of 
OCR efforts in other cities is their failure to contrast mid-1970s' issues 
with either current or early agency concerns. The New York review was 
time-specific. When the OCR was developing plans for the review, na-
tionwide opposition to expansive court-ordered desegregation had in-
tensified. The OCR sought to reclaim its role as pacesetter for equal 
education opportunity by pursuing relatively novel issues like intradis-
trict resource allocation. Although the OCR's pursuit of such remedial 
techniques is certainly an important chapter in its history, it is improper 
to judge the agency's institutional competence on the basis of such en-
deavors isolated from that historical context. In the 1960s, the OCR 
demonstrated its effectiveness in challenges to simple segregation in 
southern school systems. Today, the OCR's laxity, rather than being 
an index of agency ineptness, may well reflect the Reagan administra-
tion's "new federalism" in education.23 Consequently, OCR perform-
ance should be measured both by the agency's adherence to its 
ideological mission and by the nature of reform that it seeks to accom-
plish during a particular period. 
Rebell and Block's study, although longitudinal in nature, never 
considers these issues. Instead, the authors, focusing on the period 
leading up to settlement agreements in New York City, emphasize that 
"[a]n administrative agency like OCR lacks ... staying power" (p. 185) 
and that "a court, as compared with OCR, is better able to monitor 
compliance on a long-term basis and to respond to unforeseen devel-
opments that arise during the implementation process" (p. 185). This 
concern about changing political agendas, aside from being short 
sighted, ignores separation of powers principles, title VI's amorphous 
language, and congressional restrictions on tide VI enforcement. 
Rebell and Block do not consider that, under our tripartite system, 
Congress is free to grant substantive discretion to the administering 
agency to advance what it considers to be the public interest.24 In the 
case of tide VI, neither Congress nor the courts (until 1983),25 pro-
vided meaningful guidance as to what constituted illegal discrimina-
tion. The OCR thus had great leeway in defining its statutory mission. 
Moreover, the ali-or-nothing nature of the fund termination sanction 
severely limited the OCR's ability to enforce that statute sensibly. Con-
sequently, what Rebell and Block consider inherent defects in adminis-
Sept. 24, 1980). See generally Devins & Stedman, supra note 6 (examining the effects of 
Reagan administration's "new federalism" on school desegregation in Chicago). 
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
24. Rabkin & Devins, Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with 
the Federal Government 16-25 (manuscript in progress) (draft on file at the offices of 
the Columbia Law Review). 
25. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plurality 
opinion), the Supreme Court ruled that proof of intentional discrimination was intended 
by the framers of title VI but that executive agencies were empowered to enforce title VI 
through statistically-based proofs of discrimination. 
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trative enforcement ability reflect instead the interplay of poor 
legislative drafting and constitutionally protected executive functions. 
The authors' failure adequately to acknowledge separation of pow-
ers concerns is also reflected in their conclusion that tide VI enforce-
ment would be enhanced if greater reliance were placed on "the courts 
in monitoring the implementation of agreements emerging from the 
administrative process" (p. 201). Courts simply do not have the institu-
tional authority to administer such agreements-unless, of course, 
those agreements are a byproduct of litigation. The executive's consti-
tutional power to enforce the laws should not be hamstrung by the pol-
icy preferences of a previous administration.26 With respect to the 
OCR, civil rights groups, and the executive, in a case now tided Adams 
v. Bennett, 27 have batded for fifteen years over OCR enforcement of tide 
VI.28 Under Adams, the OCR was required to follow court-approved 
criteria governing the administration of tide VI complaints.29 Despite 
this interminable litigation, OCR has never been able to comply with 
the time frames established in Adams. In the end, as Jeremy Rabkin 
argues, "the Adams litigation has left OCR in many ways a less effective 
and less trusted civil rights guardian than it was at the outset."30 
Even if these analytical criticisms were put aside, Equality and 
Education would still fail, for the authors are unwilling to reveal their 
perceptions regarding the appropriate scope of federal civil rights en-
forcement. In a curious footnote at the end of the text, they reveal 
their internal disagreement regarding the need for their work to reflect 
a policy position. Arthur Block, pointing to "the slackening of federal 
26. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 24, at 7-9. 
27. This case, originally captioned Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), 
modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), is the remand of Women's Equity Action 
League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (joined with Adams v. Bell), the latest in this 
series of dispositions. It is now pending before the District Court for the District of 
Columbia under the caption Adams v. Bennet, because in actions against federal agencies, 
the name of the defendant changes with the change of department heads. 
28. See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 23-25. Adams v. Richardson too might have played 
some role in spurring the OCR to reach an agreement in New York, for the agency was 
anxious to demonstrate the adequacy of its compliance review procedures. The authors 
acknowledge this (p. 156); but they do not consider other court cases that might have 
influenced board-agency action. Board hiring practices were subject to judicial scrutiny 
in Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), and student service 
practices were challenged in Hart v. Community School Bd. ofEduc., 512 F.2d 37 (2d 
Cir. 1975), and Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 
(2d Cir. 1979). Finally, the school board and OCR were actively engaged in litigation 
regarding OCR distribution of desegregation-related funds. Board of Education v. 
Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). Some of these cases are mentioned in the book, but the 
authors never explore the possible impact of these cases on either the settlement or 
implementation process. 
29. The Adams litigation may end in the near future. The D.C. Circuit recently sug-
gested that the plaintiffs in Adams lack standing. Women's Equity Action League v. Bell, 
743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
30. Rabkin, supra note 2, at 26. 
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civil rights enforcement," claims that the book's findings "need to be 
seen in a broader historical perspective" (p. 202 n.*). In contrast, 
Michael Rebell asserts that it is neither "necessary [n]or appropriate to 
relate the book's research findings and recommendations, which stand 
on their own, to political developments occurring at any particular 
time" (p. 202 n.*). Mr. Rebell won the battle but lost the war; for the 
book is vacuous on such emotional issues as what constitutes illegal dis-
crimination, how far the reach of federal enforcement is, and what con-
stitutes an appropriate civil rights agenda. In short, the authors never 
disclose whether they view the New York City experiment as a worth-
while enterprise. 
CoNCLUSION 
Equality and Education promises much, but offers little. The au-
thors' conclusions regarding the OCR extend only to its New York City 
review, which, considering the anomalous nature of that experiment, is 
not very far. In fact, considering the authors' failure to give adequate 
space to Reagan-era action in their study, even the narrowest ofRebell 
and Block's conclusions are questionable. Finally, their insensitivity to 
constitutionally protected executive authority as well as to the dimen-
sions of Congress' grant of title VI authority undercuts both their as-
sessment of OCR effectiveness and their recommendations regarding 
judicial enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination in education. 
To anyone who is not a dedicated student of New York City politics or 
federal civil rights enforcement, this book is of limited value. 
